Landmines/Explosive Remnants of War and the War
on Terrorism in the MENA
This article looks at the relationship between the existing landmine and explosive remnants of war1 problem in
the Middle East and North Africa, and terrorist activities in the area by explaining the scope of the mine/ERW
Collected UXO in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2007.

by planting new mines, which the PKK
denies. Field research done in the Kurdish
Dicle district, which was conducted by the
Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey on behalf
of the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines to
examine incidents in 2007, suggests a different
picture. Local communities reported that the
incidents were caused by “old” mines laid by
the security forces. The victims are mostly
poor Kurdish villagers who were evacuated
in 1991–1992 and have now returned to their
villages. According to them, many minefields
are insufficiently marked or completely
unmarked. The returning villagers are in
danger when going to their fields, vineyards,
gardens and water resources. Additionally,
MRE is almost non-existent in the affected
regions, except for some warning signs by the
Turkish Army in some areas.
The Turkish government plans to issue a
tender for commercial companies to demine
areas along the Syrian border.10 Clearance of
all mined areas on the Syrian border would
cost around US$600 million and would be
undertaken by companies that would use the
land for agriculture in order to create new
employment opportunities in the region.
Should this plan work out, it would confiscate
a 510-kilometre-long (317-mile-long) stretch
of mostly fertile land and grant it to big companies, potentially hindering the small farmers from going back to their villages, unless
they become low-paid wage workers.
Iraq: Unifying Mine Action
Some 5.5 million people live in the
Kurdistan region in northern Iraq, of which
four million are Kurds. The Landmine
Monitor puts it clearly: “The Kurdish governorates, some of the most contaminated areas
of the world with 1,428 affected communities,
contend with thousands of tactical minefields
on the borders with Iran and Turkey and further contamination along the Green Line,
the former frontline between Kurdish forces
and Saddam Hussein’s Army, as well as UXO
across all three governorates.”11 Four thousand out of 5,000 villages were destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988,
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and many of them were mined after the evacuation. Between 1991 and 2000 alone, 10,997
mine/UXO casualties were reported in six
governorates of northern Iraq; 3,697 people
were killed and 7,300 injured.
The first Kurdish rebellion in modern
Iraq started in 1961 under the leadership of
Mustafa Barzani, the father of today’s Regional
President Masud Barzani. In 1970, the autonomous Kurdistan region was established for
the first time in an agreement with the central
government in Baghdad. But from then until
1991, its status was disputed and subject to
violent conflicts. The most infamous event in
this series of conflicts was the “Anfal” campaign by Saddam Hussein’s forces with the use
of chemical weapons and a poison-gas attack
against the Kurdish town of Halabja.
Following an insurgency, in the aftermath
of the first Iraq conflict, and with military
support by the United States and its allies, the
Kurdish parties Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
and Kurdistan Democratic Party took control
of the region in October 1991. After the start
of the Iraq War in 2003, the Kurdistan region
became a semi-autonomous, federally recognised, political entity. However, the Kurdistan
region remains part of the Federal Republic
of Iraq, and PUK leader Jalal Talabani is
the President of Iraq. Both the PUK and the
KDP, forming a coalition now in the region,
are committed to mine action. Even before
the invasion of Iraq by the United States and
its allies in 2003, as de facto authorities in
northern Iraq, they signed and implemented
Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment in 2002.
The two existing mine-action centres in Arbil
and Suleymaniyah are conducting demining
and MRE programmes on a large scale. Mines
Advisory Group, since 1992, and Norwegian
People’s Aid, since 1997, have been conducting such programmes, too. On a small scale,
the PPK is also demining for humanitarian
purposes and carries out ad hoc MRE in the
Qandeel Mountains.
The Kurdish Parliament passed a law unifying the two existing mine-action centres
into the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency,
something it had done even before Iraq recently

joined the Ottawa Convention. A unified
mine-action agency for the whole region is a
big step toward further strengthening of mine
action and toward a mine-free Kurdistan.
Conclusion
While the situation varies in each of the
four states with Kurdish populations—Syria,
Iran, Turkey and Iraq—Kurds are demanding rights on every level in the midst of local
and global conflicts. These conflicts create the
need for organised mine action and Kurdish
regional legislation to protect the local populations from UXO and landmines.
See Endnotes, page 110
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problem in the region; the huge availability of explosives for use in illegal activities, particularly terrorism; and
the case of Algeria and Egypt being affected by recent terrorist acts.
by Ayman Sorour
[ Protection Against Armaments & Consequences ]

T

he Middle East and North Africa region is affected by mines/
ERW because of the many wars and conflicts this region witnessed since the 1940s through today. Historically and geographically, the mine/ERW problem began in MENA around the end of
World War II in North Africa, and continued through the invasion of
Iraq by Coalition Forces in 2003. In addition, a number of internal conflicts and wars have resulted in contamination. These internal conflicts
have taken place in: Oman (1964–1975), Lebanon (1975–1990), Yemen
(1994) and Algeria (1991–present). Securing borders and strategic locations are other reasons for existing mines in Algeria, Egypt, Israel
Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and maybe other countries.
Tons of Explosives Available for Use
There are 15 affected countries and territories in MENA contaminated with millions of mines and ERW. Some of those countries have
declared the numbers of mines and ERW in their lands, though others
have not as they do not know how many remain. All affected countries,
however, have projections based on estimated affected land and previous
demining operations.
Regional projections vary greatly, totaling 52–66 million mines and
ERW. The estimated contaminations of each country are as follows:
• Algeria: 2,783,555
• Egypt: 21,600,000 (only 20–25 percent are mines)
• Iran: 12–16 million
• Iraq: 8–12 million before the 2003 Coalition invasion, which
surely increased those numbers
• Israel: 260,000, emplanted by Israel for security reasons
• Jordan: 203,000
• Kuwait: small number after clearance of 5–7 million
• Lebanon: 406,000 mines and 4 million ERW, the majority of
which are cluster submunitions left after the last Israeli conflict
with Hezbollah/Lebanon in July and August 2006
• Libya: 1.5–3 million
• Syria: 500,000
• Tunisia: 3,240 mines and an unknown number of ERW
• Yemen: 150,000 to 2 million
In Oman, Palestine and Western Sahara, the numbers of mines and
ERW are unknown.
Given the fact that the aforementioned mines and ERW differ in type
and composition, the amount of live explosives they contain differs, too.
On average, the live explosives can be estimated at 0.25 grams (0.88

ounces) per item, 2 which means the quantity of available live explosives
in MENA is between 13,151 and 16,489 metric tons (16,229 U.S. tons).
These explosives are not secured and cannot be secured due to the fact
that the large part of lands where they are found is not easily accessible
for political reasons, as in Iraq, or because no survey has been completed, as in Algeria, Egypt and Libya.
The first question that may come to mind is: How easy is it to clear
such mines and ERW, considering the very low level of practical experience of those who do it? The answer is that it is undoubtedly risky and
dangerous work, but in some affected countries, mines and ERW can
be found on the land’s surface, like the way the Iraqi Army planted
landmines in Kuwait. Previous munitions stores and abandoned arms
caches, such as the many the Iraqi Army left behind after the initial
Coalition Forces invasion in 2003, are also obvious locations. In other
places, locals may have little experience to help them clear mines and
ERW. For instance, Polisario said mines it has are those it cleared from
the Moroccan defensive walls built to divide Western Sahara between
them and Morocco. Consequently, the possibility of mine and ERW
clearance by a person with a very low level of experience is a reality.
Explosives for Free and Illegal Activities
It is not known when explosives from mines and ERW were first
used in illegal activities, but it is not a recent occurrence. Explosives
from mines and ERW have historically been used in fishing and mining operations, providing a cheap and easy method for both activities.
Some Bedouins in remote areas use these explosives to secure their private properties from thieves or to secure their drug plants from others,
including police forces.
Since 2003, explosives from mines and ERW have been used in terrorist acts in MENA. In Iraq, a 2003 attack against the United Nations
headquarters in Baghdad resulted in the death of the U.N. envoy to Iraq
and the death and injury of more than a dozen others. This terrorist
attack was one of the biggest uses of that type of explosive; this use of
explosives continues in Iraq. Similar terrorist acts occurred in Sinai,
Egypt, in October 2004, July 2005 and in April 2006. The government
admitted that explosives in those terrorist acts were taken from mines
and ERW. Although the Algerian government did not announce the origin of explosives used by the two car bombers in April 2007 who attacked
the government building and police station in Algiers, and a suicide car
bomber in Lakhdaria (80 kilometers [50 miles] from Algiers), explosives
may have come from mines/ERW. Recently in Yemen, the government
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warned the Al-Houthi group and its followers about using landmines in
their ongoing conflict against government forces in the governorate of
Sa’Ada in northern Yemen.
In all MENA countries, possession of explosives in any form or type
without permission from the authorities (the army or the police) is prohibited. Violation of such laws could cost the guilty person his life or
require that he spend the rest of his life in jail. However, this appears not
to be a deterrent to the violators.
The Case of Egypt
Egypt is affected by 21.6 million mines and ERW in the western area
of the country because of WWII and the Israeli-Egyptian wars in Sinai
and the Red Sea area. Because 75 to 80 percent of this number is ERW,
explosives comprising those mines and ERW are estimated at 5,400 met-

300 persons. In April 2006, five explosions, three of them targeting the
tourist area of Dahab, Sinai, resulted in the death and injury of more
than 100 persons. The other two explosions targeted the multinational
force in the El-Goura area, although there were no casualties. According
to the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, explosives used in these incidents
were taken from mines and ERW in Sinai.
In 2006, there were many reports on the transfer and stockpiling of
landmines and explosive remnants of war by individuals. In May 2006, a
farmer in Ismailia, located 120 kilometers (75 miles) northwest of Cairo,
found 210 pieces of unexploded ordnance and 4,000 bullets on his land
while he was preparing it for cultivation. The same month, the police
forces found 20 active landmines among packages of TNT in a cave
in Risan Mountain on the Sinai Peninsula. In June 2006, police forces
found pieces of unexploded ordnance—such as air-dropped bombs,

Algerian anti-personnel mines before being destroyed as part of stockpile destruction, Hasi Bahbah, South Algeria, May 2005.

groups, mainly the Salafist Group for Jihad,
which recently joined Al-Qaida and renamed
itself “Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic
Maghreb Countries.” The estimated explosives in mines and ERW in Algeria amount to
696 metric tons (685 U.S. tons). Many affected
areas in Algeria are not marked or fenced as
old fences have been stolen or have disappeared either because of climate conditions
or because of official carelessness. Terrorist
groups in Algeria have used landmines and
improvised explosives devices against security forces since the early 1990s. In August
2006, 31 military persons were injured
because terrorist groups planted landmines
and booby traps in the Boumhani forest in
east El-Bouira governorate, East Algiers,
when security forces were following them. In
October 2006, three soldiers were killed and
another 15 injured in a similar operation in
Béjaïa governorate. In April 2007, two explosions, one of them targeting the government
palace in Center Algiers and the other targeting a police station in East Algiers, resulted
in the death and injury of more than 160
persons. In July 2007, an explosion targeted
a military base in Al-Akhdaria area, Bouira
governorate, resulting in the death and injury
of more than 30 military personnel. Although
authorities did not announce or confirm that
explosives used in those acts came from mines
or ERW, the fact that the terrorist group in
Algeria is part of Al-Qaida, which uses the
same methods in Iraq, and that the source of

explosives used is unknown, indicates a high
possibility that recovered mine and ERW
explosives were used.
Additionally, police arrested a small group
of criminals with 188 French APID51 mines3
they had removed from old minefields to use
in fishing. In July 2007, the police force of
Tlemcen in West Algeria arrested a criminal
group of eight for transferring and stockpiling anti-personnel mines. The criminal group
would remove anti-personnel mines from
the mined area of Ain-El-Safra, El-Na’ama
governorate, and transfer them to the Salam
Belashash area, near the border with Morocco,
to remove TNT and then sell it. The authority arrested part of the group while they
were transferring 100 APMs, and then found
another 289 APMs cached in Ain-El-Safra.
Conclusion
Analyzing the similarities between terrorist attacks in Egypt and Algeria will clarify the
connection between terrorist groups in both
countries, reflected in these groups’ usage of
recovered landmines and ERW in suicidebomber cars as well as a common membership
in Al-Qaida. The huge amounts of explosives
available from mines and ERW throughout
MENA, and confirmed and suspected use
in previous terrorist acts, should alarm us.
Officials are encouraged to study such relations carefully and be ready to deal with them,
particularly in the absence of any mine-action
programs in these countries.
See Endnotes, page 110
For additional references for this article,
please visit http://tinyurl.com/3zxqsl.
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ric tons (5,315 U.S. tons). Most affected areas in Egypt are not marked or
fenced because old fences have been stolen or have disappeared due to
either climate conditions or carelessness by officials; yet in most affected
areas, local people, who in some areas are Bedouin, know quite well the
affected or suspected areas. They gained this knowledge by living with
mines and ERW for many years and from the many accidents that happened to their families or animals.
In October 2004, four explosions that targeted three tourist sites
in Taba and Dahab in Sinai, 450 kilometers (280 miles) east of Cairo,
resulted in the death and injury of more than 150 persons. In July 2005,
two explosions targeted a tourist site and parking nearby in Sharm elSheikh, South Sinai, and resulted in the death and injury of more than
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ordnance and artillery shells—in the Al-Khutmiyah area. In October
2006, the police arrested a scrap dealer in Al-Arish city of North Sinai
for possessing 64 landmines. The man said he used to clear landmines
himself, remove the explosives and sell the metal from the landmines.
The difficult experience Egypt has faced in Sinai from terrorist acts using
explosives from mines and ERW, and the possible use of such explosives
again, highlights the need to study the situation carefully.
The Case of Algeria
Algeria is affected by 2,783,555 mines and ERW on its borders
with Tunisia in the east and Morocco in the west. 2 This contamination results from the colonial era and ongoing fighting with terrorist

Garth Stewart, 24, lost part of his leg while serving with the U.S. Army in Iraq. In the summer
of 2007, he took a big step toward improved recovery with the world’s first robotic ankle. The
device, which is unique in design and function, uses tendon-like springs and an electric motor
to propel the user forward. This forward motion helps reduce fatigue while improving balance
and providing a better, more fluid gait.
Conventional prostheses have a passive response toward walking, requiring more energy expenditure for amputees with prostheses than those with a robotic ankle. The new ankle was created
through the Center for Restorative and Regenerative Medicine, a collaborative effort that includes the Providence (Rhode Island) Veterans’ Affairs Medical Center, Brown University and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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